Common Cause of Utah et al v. Utah Public Service Commission et al : Brief Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
Common Cause of Utah et al v. Utah Public
Service Commission et al : Brief Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Alan E. Walcher; Randolph L. Dryer; Robert S. Campbell; Attorney for Intervenor;
Robert B. Hansen; Michael L. Deamer; Joseph P. McCarthy; Attorneys for Appellants;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Service Comm., No. 15685 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1145
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMON CAUSE, a District of Columbia, 
non-profit corporation and MARJORIE 
J, THOMAS, an individual, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents,) 
vs. 
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and 
MILLY 0. BERNARD, OLOF E. ZUNDEL and 
KENNETH RIGTRUP, in their capacities 
as Commissioners of the PUBLIC 
SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
Appeal Bo. lSfiJ 
Defendant-Intervenor and 
Appellant. 
___ __.__F I L E 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
COMMON CAUSE and 
MARJORIE J. THOMAS 
SEP 151978 
Clorl. Suprema Collrt, Utn 
Appeal from Declaratory Judgment of the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Peter F. Leary, District Judge 
ALAN E. WALCHER 
318 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondents 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY 
236 State Capital 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CpmmjssiOD and Cgmmjssjoners 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
GLEN E. DAVIES 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main Street 
12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
R. G. GROUSSMAN 
General Counsel 
180 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84139 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE............................. 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT........................ 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL........................... 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. • . • . . . . . • . • • . • . . . • . • • . . . • . • • • • • 3 
1. The Public Service Commission............. 3 
2. The Utah Open and Public Meetings Act..... 5 
3. Ruling of the Lower Court................. 6 
ARGUMENT.......................................... 7 
POINT I 
POINT II 
POINT III 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
TO DECIDE THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY 
1. The Administrative Rule 
Making Act Expressly 
Authorizes the District 
Court to Determine the 
Validity of Any Procedure 
7 
Used by the Commission...... 7 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 
(1953) Does Not Divest The 
District Court of 
Jurisdiction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
COMMON CAUSE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO 
APPEAR BEFORE THE COMMISSION AS 
A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THIS 
LITIGATION 
THE COMMISSION, IN PROMULGATING 
RATES, IS A LEGISLATIVE BODY 
AND IS SUBJECT TO THE OPENNESS 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT 
THERE IS NO IMPLIED EXEMPTION 
TO THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT 
(i} 
11 
13 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT V 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
1. The Commission is Consti-
tutionally Prohibited From 
Performing and Does Not 
Perform Judicial Functions. 17 
2. In Setting and Establishing 
Rates, The Commission 
Exercises No Quasi-Judicial 
Power...................... 17 
3. Even if the Commission's 
Rate Making Procedures Were 
Painted as Being Quasi-
Judicial, the Act Remains 
Applicable................. 22 
APPLICATION OF THE OPEN AND 
PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT TO THE 
COMMISSION'S DELIBERATIONS 
DOES NOT RESULT IN A DENIAL 
OF DUE PROCESS ................ . 
l. The Legislature Constitu-
tionally May Require Legis-
la~lve Bodies, Such as The 
Commission, to Conduct All 
Functions in Open and Public 
24 
Meetings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 
2. Even If the Rate Making 
Deliberations of the 
Commission Were Acts of a 
"Judicial" Nature, Due 
Process does not Require 
Such Acts to be Performed 
Behind Closed Doors........ 27 
3. Appellants' Reliance Upon 
Foreign Case Authority is 
Misplaced. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 
A. The Pollution Control 
and Occldental Chemlcal 
Decisions.............. 30 
B. The Arizona Press Club 
Decision.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 
(ii) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT VI 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
c. The Jordon 
Decis~on ........... 
D. The Stillwater 
Savin~s & Loan 
Decision ........•.. 
E. The School District 
No. 9 Dec~s~on •.•..• 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-3-21(4) (1953) 
DOES NOT MANDATE CLOSED 
DELIBERATIVE SESSIONS .......... . 
Page 
35 
36 
37 
38 
CONCLUSION......................................... 40 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Arizona Press Club v. Arizona Bd. of Tax Appeals, 
558 P.2d 697 (Ariz. 1976) ...................... . 
Bateman v. Bd. of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 
P. 2d 381 (1958) ................................ . 
Buhler v. Stone, 533 P.2d 292 (Utah, 1975) ....... . 
Canney v. Bd. of Public Instruction of Alachua 
County, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973) ............. . 
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314 
(1945) .....................................•.... 
Gourd v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 
449 (1967) ...•...............................•.. 
Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 26 Utah 2d 198, 485 
p. 2d 1035 (1971) ............................... . 
Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co., 
18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963 (1966) ............. . 
In re Stevens Estate, 102 Utah 255, 130 P.2d 85 
(1942) ......................................... . 
(iii) 
32,33, 
34,35,37 
29 
38 
25,26,27, 
30,31,32,40 
28 
23 
23 
24 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued) 
Cases 
Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. Public Utilities 
Comm., 63 Utah 392, 226 P. 456 (1924) .......... . 
Jordon v. Dist. of Columbia, 362 A.2d 114 (D.C. 
1976) ..•....•......•.............•.....•........ 
Lewis v. Wycoff, 18 Utah 2d 255, 420 P.2d 117 
(1966) .................•........................ 
Logan City v. Public Utilities Comm., 72 Utah 563, 
271 P. 961 (1928) .............................. . 
Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938) ....... . 
Mountain States Tel. v. Public Ser. Comm., 107 
Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184 (1945) .................. . 
Mulcahy v. Public Ser. Comm., 101 Utah 245, 117 
P.2d 298 (1941) ................................ . 
Occidental Chem~cal Co. v. Mayo, 351 So.2d 336 
(Fla. 1977) ...................•............... 
Rio Grande l'1c ~onJav ·,;. Public Ser. Comm., 21 
Utah 2d 377, 455 P.2d 990 (1969) ............... . 
Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction, 52 Utah 
210, 173 P. 556 (1918) ......................... . 
School District No. 9 v. District Boundary Bd., 
351 P.2d 106 (Wyo. 1960) ....................... . 
State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911 (Utah, 1974) .... 
State Department of Pollution Control v. State 
Career Service Comm., 320 So.2d 846 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1975) ................................. . 
Stillwater Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Oklahoma 
Savings & Loan Bd., 534 P.2d 9 (Okla. 1975) ..... 
U.S. v. American Trucking Ass'n., 310 u.s. 534 
(1940) ......................................... . 
(iv) 
17,18 
35,36 
9 
13,15, 
16 
28 
23,24 
18,19,20 
21,22 
31 
24 
13,14,15 
17,18 
37,38 
23 
31,32 
36 1 37 
23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued) 
Cases 
U.S. Smelting, Refining & Milling Co. v. Utah 
Power & Light, 58 Utah 168, 196 P. 902 (1921) •... 
Union Pacific RR. Co. v. Public Ser. Comm., 103 
Utah 459, 135 P.2d 915 (1943) ...•..........•..•. 
Utah Copper Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 59 
Utah 191, 203 P. 727 (1921) •...............•.... 
Constitutions and Statutes 
Ariz. Rev. Stats. § 38-431.01 ..............•.....• 
Ariz. Rev. Stats. § 38-431.08 ...................•• 
D.C. Code § l-1503a (1977 Supp.) .................. 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-1 (1977 Supp.) .............. 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2 (2) (1977 Supp.) ........•... 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-3 (1977 Supp.) .............. 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-4 (1977 Supp.) .............. 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-5 (1977 Supp.) .............. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-2 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974) ..... 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-3 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974) ....• 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-7 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974) ..... 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-21(4) (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974). 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974) •...• 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974) ..... 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(1) (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974). 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(2) (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974). 
(v) 
13,14,15 
9,10 
13,14, 
15,16 
33 
33 
36 
5,6 
13,16 
5 
6 
6,29 
3 
3 
3 
38,39 
3,9 
4 
3 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued) 
Constitutions and Statutes 
Page 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974) ..•. 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974) .... 4' 7' 9' 
10,11,29 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-1 (Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978) .... 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-2 (Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978) .... 8,11 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-3(4) (Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978). 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 153-46-9 (Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978) .... 8,12 
UTAH CONST. art. v, § 1 ........................... 17 
UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ........................ 17 
Other Authorities 
1 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, § 181 (1962) ... 21,22 
Anderson, Act~ons fer Declaratory Judgments, 
(2d ed. 1951' .. " ..........................•.. 12 
(vi) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMON CAUSE, a District of 
Columbia, non-profit corpora-
tion and MARJORIE J. THOMAS, 
an individual, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
and MILLY 0. BERNARD, OLOF E. 
ZUNDEL and KENNETH RIGTRUP, in 
their capacities as Commission-
ers of the PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants and 
Appellants, 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
Defendant-Intervenor 
and Appellant. 
Appeal No. 15685 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
COMMON CAUSE and 
MARJORIE J. THOMAS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for declaratory judgment brought by the 
plaintiffs-respondents seeking a judicial determination of a single 
issue, to-wit: Whether or not the Utah Open & Public Meetings Act' 
is applicable to the Utah Public Service Commission when the 
Commission deliberates, votes upon, establishes, or otherwise 
evaluates existing or proposed utility rates. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In October, 1977, plaintiff-respondents Marjorie Thomas, 
individually and for and on behalf of Utah Common Cause, a citi-
zens interest group (hereinafter sometimes collectively referred 
to as "COMJ."!ON CAUSE") filed suit against the Utah Public Service 
Commission and the individual Commissioners (hereinafter some-
times collectively referred to as the "COMMISSION") (R. 2). In 
November, 1977, Mountain Fuel Supply Company (hereinafter referred 
to as "MOUNTAIN FUEL") moved and, pursuant to stipulation, was 
granted leave to intervene as a party defendant. (R. 85). All 
parties thereafter moved for summary judgment, entered into a 
stipulated pretrial order and argued their respective motions on 
December 19, 1977. In January, 1978, the court entered its order 
granting the motion of COMMON CAUSE and denying the motions of 
MOUNTAIN FUEL and ~f the COMMISSION and judgment accordingly was 
entered declarlng that the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act app1ie 
to and governs those meetings of the Utah Public Service Commissior. 
wherein that body deliberates, votes upon, establishes or other-
wise evaluates existing or proposed public utility rates. (R. 145-
146; 150-151). An appeal was subsequently brought both by MOUNTAI' 
FUEL and by the COMMISSION. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents request that this Court affirm the declaratory 
judgment entered by the trial court. 
-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case was tried and judgment entered in favor of 
COMMON CAUSE upon stipulated facts. COMMON CAUSE generally 
agrees with the statement of facts as set forth by the COMMISSION 
as the same is substantially consistent with the stipulated fact-
ual record. MOUNTAIN FUEL, however, has chosen to embellish and 
enlarge upon the factual record upon which this suit was originally 
tried and yet, in so doing, omits several relevant and germain 
facts. Accordingly, COMMON CAUSE is compelled to set forth its own 
statement of facts which is based primarily upon the stipulated fact-
ual record before the lower court. 
1. The Public Service Commission. The Constitution of the 
State of Utah empowers the legislature to supervise and regulate 
1/ 
public utilities operating within the state. The legislature has 
delegated its rate making powers to the Public Service Commission, 
2/ 
an agency of the Department of Business Regulation. The rates 
charged to consumers by every public utility operating within Utah 
3/ 
must be filed with the Commission and open to public inspection. 
4/ 
No rate other than as on file may be charged to any consumer. Rate 
not be changed absent formal application to the 
an express finding by the Commission that the change 
When an application for a rate increase is made, the 
schedules may 
5/ 
Commission and 
6/ 
is justified. 
7/ 
Commission schedules a hearing concerning the propriety thereor. 
1. R. 89 
2. Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-4-1, et seq. (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974) 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-2 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974) 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-7 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974) 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-3 (Rep1. Vol. 6A, 1974) 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(1) (Rep1. Vol. 6A, 1974) 
7. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-12(2) (Rep1. Vol. 6A, 1974) 
-3-
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After providing all interested parties a full and fair opportun-
ity to be heard in support of their respective positions, the 
Commission either grants or denies the requested increase or es-
8/ 
tablishes a new rate in lieu of that requested~ Any new rate is 
thereafter the authorized rate unless modified upon rehearing by 
9/ 
the Commission or set aside by the Supreme Court as an abuse of 
10/ 
the Commission's authorit~ 
With respect to the authority and procedure of the 
Commission, MOUNTAIN FUEL and the COMMISSION have stipulated to 
the following: 
1. That the legislature is vested with the power and 
authority to set and determine utility rates. (R. 89). 
2. That such legislative power and authority has been 
delegated by the legislature to the COMMISSION. (R. 89). 
3. Tha~ i£ called as witnesses, the three individual 
Commissioners WO'-'-'-'-' ':2S":i£y tnat they hold administrative hearings 
concerning the propriety and reasonableness of utility rates and 
that upon the conclusion of such administrative hearings they con-
vene in private for the purpose of deliberating, evaluating, votins 
or otherwise acting upon public utility rates. (R. 89). 
4. That if COMMON CAUSE requested permission from the 
COMMISSION, or any of the Commissioners thereof, to attend any of 
said private sessions, such request would be denied. (R. 91). 
8. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974) 
9. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974) 
10. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974) 
-4-
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2. The Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. In February, 
1977, the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Open and Public Meet-
11/ 
ings Act (hereafter "Act"). The Act requires all "public bodies" 
to meet openly before the public in the exercise of all functions 
entrusted to them, subject to specific exceptions enumerated with-
12/ 
in the Act itself which are not herein relevant. This openness 
requirement was enacted pursuant to the legislature's explicit 
finding and declaration that, 
•.. the state, its agencies and political sub-
divisions, exist to aid in the conduct of the 
people's business. It is the intent of the law 
that their actions be taken openly and that 
their deliberations be conducted openly. Utah 
Code Ann. § 52-4-1 (1977 Supp.) (emphasis 
added). 
Despite passage of the Act, the COMMISSION has continued 
to conduct its ratemaking deliberations in secret and has made no 
attempt to comply with the procedures set forth in the Act for 
closing a meeting. This policy of deliberating in secret has re-
ceived the express approval of the Utah Attorney General who issued 
a formal opinion to the effect that deliberations of the COMMISSION 
13/ 
were impliedly exempt from the requirements of the Ac~ The 
Legislative General Counsel, however, has formally issued a con-
lY 
trary opinion. 
11. Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1, et seq. (1977 Supp.) 
12. Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-3 (1977 Supp.); R. 91 
13. R. 255-260 
14. R. 251-254 
-5-
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with respect to the application of the Open Meetings Act 
to the proceedings of the COMMISSION, both appellants stipulated 
as follows: 
1. The closed sessions held by the COMMISSION wherein 
they deliberate ratemaking matters are "meetings" as that term is 
defined in the Act. (R. 89). 
2. The COMMISSION is a "public body" as that term is 
defined in the Act. (R. 89). 
3. That none of the statutory exceptions to the appli· 
cation of the openness requirements of the Act are relevant or 
applicable to this case. (R. 91). 
3. Ruling of the Lower Court. On January 4, 1978, the 
trial court entered its memorandum decision granting the motion of 
COMMON CAUSE for summa~r judgment and denying similar motions of 
the COMMISSION and "!OUYT.~. =i\i FUEL. (R. 141-143). Judgment was en-
tered on January 24, 1978, and provides in pertinent part as foll01> 
1. That the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-1 et seq. (1977 Supp.), applies 
to and governs the meetings of the Utah Public Ser-
vice Commission wherein that public body deliberates, 
votes upon, establishes, or otherwise evaluates exist-
ing or proposed public utility rates, tolls, charges, 
rentals or classifications. The Utah Open and Public 
Meetings Act requires the Public Service Commission 
to exercise these legislatively delegated rate making 
powers in proceedings open to the public unless such 
meetings are closed by the Commission pursuant to 
§§ 52-4-4 and 52-4-5 of the Act. (R. 146) .· 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION 
TO DECIDE THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY 
The COMMISSION acknowledges that the district court had 
jurisdiction to decide the present controversy. (R. 89.) However, 
MOUNTAIN FUEL has argued that Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (Repl. Vol. 
6A, 1974) divests the district court of jurisdiction. This argu-
ment completely ignores the Administrative Rule Making Act which 
clearly and expressly grants the district court jurisdiction to 
determine the validity of administrative agency policy. Further, 
MOUNTAIN FUEL's argument erroneously interprets § 54-7-16 to apply 
across the board to any conduct or action of the COMMISSION. As 
the following section demonstrates, § 54-7-16 applies only to orders 
made by the COMMISSION pursuant to the regulation of a utility. It 
does not have application to the COMMISSION's deliberative procedure 
or its interpretation of the application of the Open Meetings Act. 
1. The Administrative Rule Making Act Expressly Authorizes 
The District Court to Determine The Validity Of Any Procedure Used 
By The COMMISSION. The Administrative Rule Making Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46-1, et seq. (1953), specifies the procedure to be followed 
by agencies in promulgating the rules and regulations which govern 
their operation. It applies to all state agencies unless specifi-
cally exempted by the Act and provides that all other provisions of 
law which are inconsistent or in conflict with the Act are expressly repealed. 
-7-
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-2 (Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978). 
A rule is defined under the Act as every statement of gen-
eral applicability adopted by the agency that: 
. . . implements or interprets the law or pre-
scribes the policy of the agency in the admin-
istration of its functions or describes the or-
ganization, procedure or practice requirements 
of any agency ... Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-3(4) 
(1953). 
Once a rule is adopted by the agency under the Act, a party affecte: 
by the rule's application can challenge the validity of it in dis-
trict court: 
The validity or applicability of a rule may be 
determined in an action for declaratory judgment 
in any district court of this state (subject to 
the venue statute), if it is alleged that the 
rule, or its threatened application, interferes 
with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with 
or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the 
plaintiff. The agency shall be made a party to 
the action. A declaratory judgment may be ren-
dered w~e~her or not the plaintiff has requested 
the ~ge~~ .. ~o ?ass upon the validity or applica-
billty of the rule in question. . . Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46-9 (Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978) (emphasis added). 
The record in this case demonstrates that the COMMISSION 
is a state administrative agency which has the delegated power to 
regulate utilities and set utility rates. (R. 89). When the 
COMMISSION deliberates and votes upon the setting of utility rates, 
it prohibits the public from attending (R. 89). Clearly this 
practice is a policy used by the COMMISSION in deliberating on 
utility rates. It is, therefore, an administrative rule and the 
District Court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of it. 
-8-
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2. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (1953) Does Not Divest The 
District Court Of Jurisdiction. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL argues that Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (1953) 
divests the district court of jurisdiction. To fully understand 
§ 54-7-16 it is necessary to examine the purpose and nature of the 
COMMISSION. The Utah State Constitution empowers the legislature 
to supervise and regulate public utilities operating within the 
state. The legislature in turn delegated its rate making function 
to the COMMISSION. The sole purpose of the COMMISSION is to per-
form the legislative function of supervising and regulating utili-
ties. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974). 
The COMMISSION is vested with limited jurisdiction because 
its knowledge and expertise is presumed limited to utility regula-
tion. Lewis v. Wycoff Co., 18 Utah 2d 255, 420 P.2d 117 (1966). 
The COMMISSION does not have jurisdiction to perform a judicial 
function or make a judicial determination, Union Pac. RR. Co. v. 
Public Service Cornrn., 103 Utah 459, 135 P.2d 915. (1943). 
The reason for the COMMISSION's lack of jurisdiction to per-
form judicial functions is obvious. Judicial determinations are 
the function of the courts, not an administrative agency with dele-
gated legislative powers. The COMMISSION does not have presumed 
knowledge and expertise in judicial matters and must defer its 
judgment to the courts. Similarly, the courts must defer judgment 
to the COMMISSION on utility matters. The Utah Supreme Court em-
phasized this basic principle in Union Pac. RR. Co. v. Public 
Service Cornrn., supra: 
-9-
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... unless some justifiable question arises, 
unless some point is judicially present, this 
court will not substitute its judgment for 
that of an administrative tribunal [Public 
Service Commission] charged by law with carry-
ing out matters of a nonjudicial character. 
103 Utah at 466. (emphasis added) 
In the present case, COMMON CAUSE is not challenging a 
written order or decision of the COMMISSION which sets a rate or 
regulates a utility. COMMON CAUSE is challenging a practice, a 
"rule" of the COMMISSION which violates state law. The practice 
of holding private deliberations is not an order. It is clearly 
I 
an unwritten practice adopted by the COMMISSION which reflects its! 
administrative policy in rate setting deliberations. Consequently,' 
§ 54-7-16 has no application to this case. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL's argument creates a situation where an ad-
ministrative agency. with delegated legislative functions, is trans 
formed into a judlclal :;gency with the power to interpret state law 
of generaly applicability. Surely the legislature did not intend 
the COMMISSION to have such jurisdiction. The determination of 
general state law and its application to particular administrative: 
agencies is singularly for the courts, not the COMMISSION. 
Finally, if the COMMISSION's practice of holding private 
deliberations is an "order," as MOUNTAIN FUEL suggests, there is 
a conflict between the Administrative Rule Making Act, which allows 
declaratory judgments in district court, and the provisions of 
§ 54-7-16 which prohibit them. Even if, by some tortured con-
struction, an unwritten practice by the COMMISSION was considered 
an "order," § 54-7-16 would be repealed insofar as it was incon-
sistent with or in conflict with the Administrative Rule Making Ac: 
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This act shall be applicable to every agency of 
the state of Utah except as specifically exempted 
by this act. All other provis~ons ot law, to the 
extent they are inconsistent or in conflict with 
this act are repealed and superseded by this act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-2 (Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978) (emphasis added). 
The Public Utilities Act was originally passed in 1917, and was 
amended in 1933 and 1943. The Administrative Rule Making Act was 
passed in 1973 and superseded and repealed all other provisions of 
law inconsistent with it. Therefore, even if § 54-7-16 did apply 
to COMMISSION rules, it has been repealed by the Administrative Rule 
Making Act, and COMMON CAUSE properly sought a declaratory judgment 
in district court. 
II 
COMMON CAUSE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO 
APPEAR BEFORE THE COMMISSION AS 
A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THIS 
LITIGATION 
As the preceding section demonstrates, the Administrative 
Rule Making Act gives the district court jurisdiction to determine 
the validity of any rule or practice adopted by the COMMISSION in 
the discharge of its rate making functions. The Act not only vests 
the district court with jurisdiction, but it clearly provides that 
administrative remedies need not be exhausted before resorting to 
litigation: 
The validity or applicability of a rule may 
be determined in an action for declaratory 
judgment in any district court of this state 
The agency shall be made a party to 
the action. A declaratory judgment may be 
rendered whether or not the plaintiff has 
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requested the agency to pass upon the 
validity or applicability of the rule 
in question; . . . Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46-9 (Repl. Vol. 7A, 1978) (emphasis 
added). 
COMMON CAUSE is challenging the rule adopted by the COMMISSION to 
hold private rate making deliberations. By express provision of 
§ 63-46-9 of the Administrative Rule Making Act, COMMON CAUSE has 
standing to assert that challenge in district court without ex-
hausting their administrative remedies. 
Further, even if the Administrative Rule Making Act did 
not eliminate the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies, 
it is clear that a party need not perform a useless or futile act 
before the COMMISSION: 
Where it appears that a resort to statutory 
adminlstrative remedies would be clearly 
futile, then a declaratory judgment action 
in the nat~=e of an equitable proceeding, 
may bE ~esorted to, since equity does not 
require the doing of a useless thing. A 
court of equity in these circumstances can 
furnish an appropriate remedy, and the 
litigant ought not to be compelled to 
speculate upon the chances of obtaining 
relief by resort to the so-called adminis-
trative remedies. Anderson, Actions for 
Declaratory Judgments, § 201 (2d ed. 1951). 
The COMMISSION and MOUNTAIN FUEL stipulated that if COMMON CAUSE 
sought to attend any of the secret deliberative sessions challenged 
herein such request would be denied. (R. 91) . Since COMMON 
CAUSE would be performing a useless and futile act in presenting 
this matter to the COMMISSION, it clearly has no obligation to do 
so as a condition precedent to litigation. 
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III 
THE COMMISSION, IN PROMULGATING 
RATES, IS A LEGISLATIVE BODY 
AND IS SUBJECT TO THE OPENNESS 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACT 
The Utah Open and Public Meetings Act applies to all meetings 
of a public body. The legislature, with unusual clarity, defined 
a public body as: 
. . . any administrative, advisory, executive 
or legislative body of the state ... which 
consists of two or more persons that expends, 
disburses or is supported in whole or in part 
by tax revenue and which is invested with the 
authority to make decisions regarding the 
public's business .•. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 52-4-2 (2) (1977 Supp.). (emphasis added). 
All parties have stipulated that the COMMISSION is a "public body" 
and is covered by the Act. (R. 89, 90). The COMMISSION acts as 
a public body when it establishes rates because, as this Court has 
repeatedly announced and as the trial court found, the power to fix 
and regulate rates is inherently a legislative function delegated 
by the legislature to the COMMISSION. Salt Lake City v. Utah 
Light & Traction, 52 Utah 210, 173 P. 556 (1918); U.S. Smelting, 
Refining and Milling Co. v. Utah Power & Light, 58 Utah 168, 196 
P. 902 (1921); Utah Copper Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 59 Utah 
191, 203 P. 727 (1921); Logan City v. Public Utilities Comm., 72 
Utah 63, 271 P. 961 (1928). 
Rate regulation by the public utilities commission was 
first challenged in Utah as an unconstitutional impairment of a 
public utility's freedom to contract. This Court rejected that 
argument in Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction, 52 Utah 210, 
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173 P. 556, 559 (1918), finding that the Public Utilities Act was 
constitutional because rate regulation was a permissible legis-
lative function: 
In other words, it is universally held that 
the regulation and fixing of rates is a 
governmental function, that is, a legis-
lative function 
This holding was challenged in U.S. Smelting, Refining and Millin~ 
co. v. Utah Power & Light, 58 Utah 168, 196 P. 902 (1921). How-
ever, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that rate regulation is an in-
herent legislative power: 
It has been held repeatedly, both by the 
Supreme Court of the United States and the 
courts of last resort of many of the states, 
including this court, that the regulation 
of rates for public utilities is a govern-
mental function corning directly within the 
police power of the state ... 197 P. at 
907-908. 
The legislature's power to regulate public utility rates 
was attacked again in Utah Copper Co. v. Public Utilities Cornrn., 
59 Utah 191, 203 P. 727 (1921), where petitioner claimed that the 
COMMISSION had no authority to impose a temporary rate after find· 
ing that a permanent rate was discriminatory. The Supreme Court, 
again, succinctly stated the basis and derivation of the 
COMMISSION's authority: 
Fundamentally, the legislative or police 
power to regulate the public utilities of 
the state and fix rates rests upon the 
legal right to secure to the consuming pub-
lic, just, uniform and equitable rates, as 
applied to the service rendered. 203 P. 
at 631 
Having also been asked to review the reasonableness of the temp-
crary rate imposed by the COMMISSION, the court properly found 
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that the judiciary had no such power: 
The power conferred upon the legislature 
is supreme respecting the regulation and 
establishing of rates (citing Salt Lake 
City v. Utah Light & Traction, supra.). 
* * * 
It will be seen from the foregoing that this 
court stands committed to the doctrine that 
our Utilities Commission is purely an admin-
istrative body, clothed by the legislature 
with the power to regulate the public utili-
ties of this state, and that we, as a court, 
have no r~ght to ~nterfere with the function-
ing of the Commission until it clearly appears 
that the rates as established by it are mani-
festly unjust or confiscatory in their nature. 
203 P. at 634. (emphasis added). 
If Utah Copper Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., supra., left 
open any question as to whether the legislature's inherent power 
to regulate public utility rates could be delegated to the Public 
Utilities Commission, that question was affirmatively answered in 
Logan City v. Public Utilities Comm., 72 Utah 563, 271 P. 961, 970 
(1928) : 
That in the absence of constitutional re-
struction, the legislature may in the ex-
ercise of its police power fix or determine 
rates and charges of public utilities doing 
business within the state, or delegate the 
power to do so, and within limitations and 
restrictions regulate and control their 
service, is well settled. 
Rarely is case authority so consistent and clear. The power 
of the state to regulate public utility rates is an inherent police 
power, legislative in nature. Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & 
Traction, supra.; u.s. Smelting, Refining and Milling Co. v. Utah 
Power & Light, supra.; Utah Copper Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 
supra. This power may be delegated by the legislature to the Public 
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service Commission. Utah Co~ Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 
supra.; Logan City v. Public Utilities Comm., supra. Since the 
Public Service Commission was created by legislature for the ex-
press purpose of performing the legislature's function of regula-
ting rates and activities of public utilities, the COMMISSION's 
deliberations in rate making proceedings are expressly subject to 
the openness requirements of the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-2(2) 
(1977 Supp.). 
IV 
THERE IS NO IMPLIED EXEMPTION 
TO THE OPEN MEETINGS ACT 
In an effort to avoid the clear application of the Act to 
the COMMISSION's rate making deliberations, the COMMISSION and 
MOUNTAIN FUEL ;~a,;e :ievoc.ed the bulk of their argument to creating 
an exemption which the legislature failed to specify. The apparent 
thrust of appellants' argument is that, despite the COMMISSION's 
admitted legislative purpose, the COMMISSION acts judicially in 
establishing rates and is, therefore, exempted from the require-
ments of the Act. This argument is without merit for three 
reasons. First, as this Court has clearly indicated, the COMMISSI:' 
is constitutionally prohibited from exercising and does not ex-
ercise any judicial power. Second, in promulgating rates and 
charges, the COMMISSION exercises no "quasi-judicial" power. 
Finally, even if the COMMISSION's deliberations were painted as 
being quasi-judicial, the Act remains applicable. 
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1. The Commission is Constitutionally Prohibited From 
Performing and Does Not Perform Judicial Functions. The 
Constitution of the State of Utah, art. v, § 1, provides as 
follows: 
The powers of the government of the State 
of Utah shall be divided into three distinct 
departments, the Legislative, the Executive 
and the Judicial; and no person charged with 
the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted. 
Specifically with respect to the exercise of judicial powers, the 
Utah Constitution, art. VIII, § 1, states: 
The Judicial power of the State shall be 
vested in the Senate sitting as a court of 
impeachment, and a Supreme Court, in 
district courts, in justices of the peace, 
and such other bodies inferior to the Supreme 
Court as may be established by law. 
To accept appellants' argument that the COMMISSION, a legislative 
body, exercises judicial powers in establishing public utility 
rates, is to acknowledge an unconstitutional invasion of separation 
of powers by the COMMISSION. The constitutionality of the legis-
lature's delegation of rate making authority to the COMMISSION has 
been settled for well over 70 years. Salt Lake City v. Utah Light 
& Traction, supra. 
2. In Setting and Establishing Rates, The Commission 
Exercises No Quasi-Judicial Power. Appellants' argument that the 
COMMISSION exercises judicial-like powers in promulgating rates was 
squarely disposed of by this Court in Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. 
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Public Utilities Comm., 63 Utah 392, 226 P. 456 (1924), where it 
was held that the COMMISSION, as an arm of the legislature exer-
cises no judicial function in fixing or promulgating rates. 
In Jeremy Fuel & Grain, supra., the Court was asked tore-
view a COMMISSION order denying petitioner relief on a claim that 
it had been overcharged by a public utility. Relying upon Salt 
Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction, supra., this Court emphasized 
that it had limited review of COMMISSION rate setting because of 
the legislative character of that function. The Court wrote: 
In arriving at a proper conclusion in this 
proceeding it is of the upmost importance 
that we keep in mind that the Commission in 
fixing or promulgating rates or charges for 
services rendered by the public utilities of 
this state acts merely as an arm of the legis-
lature and that in discharging its duties the 
Commlssion cannot, and does not, exercise 
jud~cial functions. 226 P. at 458 (emphasis 
added;. 
* * * 
The fixing of rates is a legislative and not 
a judicial function. 226 P. at 456 (emphasis 
added) . 
Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. should put to rest appellants' argument tha 
rate making deliberations are, in any manner, a judicial-like pro-
ceeding. 
Subsequent decisions of this Court elaborated further on 
the nature of COMMISSION rate setting and emphasized that rate 
making decisions are not judicial in nature or consequence. Not 
only are the deliberations by the COMMISSION legislative, but this 
Court has ruled that the decision rendered is legislative in 
effect. In Mulcahy v. Public Service Comm., 101 Utah 245, 117 
-18-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
P. 2d 298 (1941), a trucking company sought a certificate of 
authority from the COMMISSION to operate along a route already 
served by petitioner railroad company and was refused. One year 
later the trucking company again applied for identical authority, 
which was granted. In this original action in the Supreme Court, 
petitioner railroad company argued that the COMMISSION's earlier 
findings against the trucking company must be applied as res 
judicata to bar the new application. Absent new evidence to 
support the application, which the record did not contain, the 
railroad company urged that the COr1MISSION had abused its authority. 
In resolving this issue, the Court stated that the doctrine 
of res judicata applies only to "judicial decisions and not to 
legislative, executive or administerial decisions." 117 P.2d at 
302. The Court recognized, however, that a legislative, executive 
or ministerial body, in the exercise of its authorized powers, could 
in some cases render a decision "judicial in its legal consequences 
and effects" as to which res judicata would apply. However, it 
found that decisions by the COMMISSION were not such a case and 
were legislative decisions not judicial decisions. 117 P.2d at 302. 
Justice Larson, writing for the majority, silenced appellants' claim 
that the procedures followed in reaching a decision were relevant 
to a determination of the nature of the decision, saying: 
The measuring rod, the test to be applied in 
determining this question, is not to be 
found in the mechanics of the proceeding. 
The mere fact that hearings are had, evidence 
taken, and decisions rendered thereon, does 
not make the decision a judicial one. 117 
P.2d at 302 (emphasis added). 
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After a painstaking analysis of the function of the COMMISSION, th, 
court properly concluded that no judicial function had been ex-
ercised: 
The inquiry, as advanced and set forth by both 
the truck company and the railroads, was ad-
dressed to the discretion of the Commission 
for its determination of matters pertaining 
primarily to the needs and conveniences of 
the public, and not to rights theretofore 
vested in, or obligations theretofore 
assumed or imposed upon either of the parties 
before the court in this action, or their 
privies. If as a result of the investigation 
the commission granted any certificate it 
would be for the relief of the public incon-
venience and needs, and not for relief from 
any infringements upon the rights of the 
party to whom the certificate was granted. 
It is evident, therefore, that there was no 
legal controversy, no controversy at law, to 
call into operation the exercise of the judi-
=ial function or power, and the findings or 
=onclusions made would, therefore, not be a 
judiclal determination or judgment, and hence 
not =es a~·udicata. 117 P.2d at 304. 
Explicit ln Mulcahy is the Court's recognition that a de-
cision, judicial in nature, purports to settle finally an issue or 
legal controversy. A decision rendered by the COMMISSION on a rat' 
increase application does not purport finally to settle anything. 
If a requested increase is rejected, nothing can stop a public 
utility from immediately filing a new request. Under Mulcahy, a 
utility's second presentation is in no way hindered or affected~ 
the rejection of its prior application. This process can and does 
continue ad infinitum with no degree of finality. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL's effort to discredit Mulcahy by arguing tha: 
the majority of the Supreme Court failed to agree upon the ratioM: 
advanced by COMMON CAUSE is without merit. (Br. 31-33). The 
-20-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
majority of the Court concurred in the result set out above. In 
that regard, Justice Wolfe, upon whose opinion MOUNTAIN FUEL places 
great emphasis, said: 
But as a regulatory tribunal designed to fur-
ther positive public ends, the commission's 
powers are predominantly legislative in 
character, and such judicial functions as it 
exercises are largely incident to the proper 
performance of its legislative duties. 117 
P.2d at 307 (emphasis in original). 
* * * 
It is not required that we determine whether 
the Commission was exercising an executive, 
legislative or judicial function. All we 
need to determine at this time is that it 
was not exercising a judicial funct~on, con-
strued as that term is in reference to courts 
and thus that res adjudicata is not applicable. 
I place my concurrence in regard to this phase 
of the case on that proposition. 117 P.2d at 
309. 
The opinions of this Court are consistent and clear. In rate 
matters, the COMMISSION performs only non-judicial functions. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL responds that other jurisdictions classify 
rate making as quasi-judicial. This is highly misleading. MOUNTAIN 
FUEL suggests, at page 29, that the general rule is reflected in 1 
Arn.Jur. 2d., Administrative Law§ 181 (1962) and quotes at length 
from that source to support its position that rate making is quasi-
judicial. However, appellants fail to continue the citation through 
the next two consecutive paragraphs: 
In determining the reasonableness of an exist-
ing rate and awarding reparations for exaction 
of an unreasonable rate, an administrative 
agency acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial 
capacity, and in declaring what rate shall be 
a reasonable one for the future, the agency 
acts in a legislative or administrative 
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capacity. Awarding reparati~n for the past and 
fixing rates for the future ~nvolves a determ-
ination of matters essentially different: one 
is in its nature private, made by the agency 
in its quasi-judicial capacity to measure past 
injuries sustained by a private shipper; the 
other is public, made by the agency in its 
quasi-legislative capacity to prevent future 
injury to the public. 
Prescribing division of rates is a legislative 
and not a judicial function. l Arn.Jur. 2d, 
Administrative Law § 181 (1962). (emphasis 
added; citations omitted). 
The "general rule" urged by MOUNTAIN FUEL coincides with the con-
sistent findings of the Utah Supreme Court: Promulgation of rates 
in the public interest does not call into play an exercise of 
judicial like functions. 
3. Even lf the Commission's Rate Making Procedures Were 
Painted as Beirog Qc:asl-JI.ldicial, the Act Remains Applicable. As 
Justice Wolfe stated in Mulcahy, supra., and as MOUNTAIN FUEL urges 
at Br. 26: 
He indeed is to be congratulated who can pick 
out the legislative, the executive, and the 
judicial ingredients of many completed admin-
istrative processes. 117 P.2d at 307. 
It is precisely for this reason that the Utah Open and Public Meet· 
ings Act is applicable to designated bodies, irrespective of the 
process utilized by the body to accomplish its objective. Appel-
lants, in essence, urge this Court to ignore every general prin-
ciple of statutory construction in manufacturing the implied ex-
emption so strenuously sought. 
It is well-recognized that a statute is open to constructi: 
only where the language used therein is ambiguous. Where no 
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ambiguity appears, it is presumed conclusively that the clear and 
explicit terms of the statute express the legislative intention. 
U.S. v. American Trucking Ass'n., 310 u.s. 534 (1940); In re 
Stevens Estate, 102 Utah 255, 130 P.2d 85 (1942). As succinctly 
stated by this Court in State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911 (1974), 
"there is nothing to construe where there is no ambiguity in the 
statute." The Utah Open and Public Meetings Act is clear- it 
applies to all bodies within the executive and legislative branch 
whenever they meet to discuss, deliberate or act upon a matter 
within their jurisdiction. 
Even if an ambiguity were shown by appellants to exist, it 
should be noted that a statute carries with it a presumption that 
it is valid and that its words and definitions were chosen advisedly 
to express the legislative intent. Gourd v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 
2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 (1967); Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 
2d 198, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971). Thus, the fact that the legislature 
chose to couch application of the Act in terms of bodies and not 
proceedings is entitled to great weight. There is nothing in the 
Act to indicate the legislature intended an inquiry be made into 
what proceeding is utilized by a public body in determining the 
applicability of the Act. 
In effect, defendants request this court to manufacture an 
exemption where none exists. Such judicial legislation is im-
proper. As stated by this Court in Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph co. v. Public Service Comm., 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184 
(1945): 
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An interpretation of a statute must be based 
on the language used, and courts have no 
power to rewrite a statute to make it conform 
to an intention not expressed in that statute. 
Finally, in arguing their case for judicial legislation, 
MOUNTAIN FUEL attempts to avail itself of the doctrine of inclusic 
unius exclusio alterius, arguing that since judicial bodies are n: 
listed in the Act they are impliedly excluded as quasi-judicial 
bodies (Br. 22). Such a doctrine, however, is utilized as an aid 
in determining the intent of the legislature only where such in-
tent is obscure or uncertain, Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island 
Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963 (1966). The doctrine t. 
no proper application when its effect would be to obstruct rather 
than to ::arr:: o'"t the stated purposes of a statute. Rio Grande 
Motorway, Inc. v. Public Service Comm., 21 Utah 2d 377, 455 P.2d 
(1969). Since the intent of the Utah Legislature in enacting thE 
Open Meetings Act is clear, the doctrine has no application in t: 
case. 
v 
APPLICATION OF THE OPEN AND PUBLIC 
MEETINGS ACT TO THE COMMISSION'S 
DELIBERATIONS DOES NOT RESULT IN 
A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS 
The COMMISSION and MOUNTAIN FUEL both assert that open 
deliberations in rate setting matters would unconstitutionally 
deny due process to interested parties. This argument is one of 
form rather than substance, which ignores that the object of the 
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deliberations is to establish rates -an admittedly legislative 
act. Moreover, appellants have misunderstood the requirements of 
due process by choosing to rely upon cases which neither discuss 
the parameters of due process nor otherwise support the position 
advanced. 
1. The Legislature Constitutionally May Require Legislative 
Bodies, Such as the COMMISSION, to Conduct All Functions in Open 
and Public Meetings. Appellants acknowledge that the COMMISSION 
is a legislatively-created body, empowered by the legislature with 
legislative authority to fix and determine public utility rates. 
Appellants then suggest, however, that the legislature cannot re-
quire this body to exercise all aspects of the authority which it 
acquired from the legislature in public view, even though it is 
uncontested that the legislature could impose such a requirement 
upon itself. The fallacy of this argument is readily apparent. 
Moreover, such an argument ignores the majority holding of the only 
reported decision found by COMMON CAUSE which is squarely applic-
able to this case. Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua 
County, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973). 
A student's long hair and his suspension from high school 
for violation of the school's dress code was the subject of the 
Florida Supreme Court's attention in Canney. A hearing was con-
ducted by the school board, admittedly a "body" within the require-
ment of openness directed by the Florida "Government in the Sunshine 
Law." At the point where a decision was to be made, the board 
recessed the public meeting to make its decision in private. The 
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student challenged this closure in the state supreme court where 
the board argued that the constitution required that its decision, 
being "quasi-judicial" in nature, be deliberated and reached in 
secret. The precise issue for the court's determination was 
whether: 
. . . a county school board, acting in a quasi-
judicial capacity, is a part of the legisla-
tive branch of government. If a county school 
board is a part of the legislative branch, then 
the Government in the Sunshine Law should be 
applicable, and any exception or amendment 
should be considered by the legislative, not 
the judicial branch. 278 So.2d at 262. 
The court expressly held that the legislature could require the 
school board to deliberate in an open and public meeting without 
offending constitutional due process requirements: 
Once ~he legislature transforms a portion of 
the board's responsibilities and duties into 
tha~ ~= a judicial character, so that the 
boar6 ~ay exercise quasi-judicial functions, 
the prerogatives of the legislature in the 
matter do not cease. The Administrative Pro-
cedure Act ... establishes minimum require-
ments for the adjudication of any party's 
legal rights, duties, privileges or immunities 
by state agencies. If the legislature may 
delegate these quasi-judicial powers to the 
school board and regulate the procedure to be 
followed in hearings before the school board, 
it follows as a matter of common logic that 
the legislature may further require all meet-
ings of the board at which public acts are to 
be taken to be public meetings open to the 
public. A board exercising quasi-judicial 
functions is not a part of the judicial branch 
of government. 
* * * 
The characterization of a decisional-making 
process by a school board as "quasi-judicial" 
does not make the body into a judicial body. 
A county school board should not be authorized 
to avoid the Government in the Sunshine Law by 
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making its own determination that an act is 
quasi-judicial. Secret meetings would be 
prevalent. The correct understanding of the 
terminology "quasi-judicial" means only that 
the school board is acting under certain con-
stitutional strictures which have been enforced 
upon all administrative boards, and not that 
the school board has become a part of the 
judicial branch. To hold otherwise would be to 
combine the legislative and judicial functions 
of one body clearly contrary to the separation 
of powers doctrine. The judiciary should not 
encroach upon the legislature's right tore-
quire that the activities of the school board 
should be conducted in the "sunshine." 278 
So. 2d at 263-264. 
Canney is particularly persuasive when the facts there are compared 
to the present case. In Canney, it was clear that the function per-
formed by the school board was quasi-judicial while no such finding 
is applicable to the COMMISSION's rate making deliberations in this 
action. In Canney, the board was asked to adjudicate the actions 
of an individual, as those actions related to a specific standard of 
conduct. In this matter, there is no such adjudication and no 
specific standard to govern a decision. The COMMISSION is directed 
to establish rates that are consonant with the interests of the 
entire consuming public, not one individual. 
2. Even If The Rate Making Deliberations of The Commission 
Were Acts of a "Judicial" Nature, Due Process Does Not Require Such 
Acts to Be Performed Behind Closed Doors. Administrative or legis-
lative proceedings of a judicial nature held behind closed doors 
and shielded from public scrutiny have long been repugnant to our 
system of justice. The concept that adjudicatory hearings be open 
to the public gaze is inherent in our idea of due process. This 
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view was voiced many years ago by the United States Supreme Court 
in Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938), in the following 
words: 
The vast expansion of this field of adminis-
trative regulation in response to the pressure 
of social needs is made possible under our 
system by adherence to the basic principles 
that the legislature shall appropriately de-
termine the standards of administrative pro-
ceedings of a quasi-judicial character. 
It does not follow that to insure a "fair and open hearing" an ad· 
ministrati ve adjudicatory body must deliberate secretly. The Utah 
Supreme Court in Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (1945), 
found no such requirement: 
In depriving a person of life or liberty, the 
essentials of due process are: (a) the exist-
en~e of a competent person, body, or agency 
au<:::-,orized l:Jy law to determine the questions; 
t;, ar inquiry into the merits of the question 
by such person, body or agency; (c) notice to 
the person of the inauguration and purpose of 
the inquiry and the time at which such person 
should appear if he wishes to be heard; (d) 
right to appear in person or by counsel; (e) 
fair opportunity to submit evidence, examine 
and cross-examine witnesses; (f) judgment to 
be rendered upon the record thus made. In the 
absence of a statute laying down other or more 
specific requirements, the above conditions 
meet the demands of due process. In the absence 
of specific provisions to the contrary, due 
process does not require that any or all of these 
requirements must be in writing or in any partic-
ular form. (emphasis added). 
The COMMISSION cannot be heard to argue that any of the elements c: 
due process listed in Christiansen is inherently offended by publi: 
deliberations. 
Interestingly, the COMMISSION and MOUNTAIN FUEL submit the 
same arguments previously advanced in the legislature by opponents 
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of the Open Meetings Act. (St. Br. 9-11; MFS Br. 36-37). For 
example, appellants assert that public scrutiny of the deliberative 
process might cause the COMMISSIONERS to be intimidated and less 
than candid with each other with the possible result that their de-
cision may not be rendered upon the record made. The legislature 
considered that argument and clearly rejected it. Reconsideration 
of the merits of that argument is for the legislature, not this 
Court. As stated by this Court in Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 
7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381, 389 (1958), the courts are "not con-
cerned with questions of policy nor with the wisdom of legislation." 
However, even if the objections to the Act were considered by this 
Court, an examination of the Act demonstrates that the objections 
are without foundation. For example, appellants express fear of 
intimidation is squarely prevented by the Act: 
This chapter shall not prohibit the removal 
of any person who willfully disrupts a meet-
ing to the extent that orderly conduct is 
seriously compromised. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 52-4-5 (3) (1977 Supp.). 
If MOUNTAIN FUEL were ever to feel that it had suffered unjustly 
before the COMMISSION, it has expedient redress in Utah Supreme 
court. This Court sits on rate making matters for the specific 
purpose of determining whether a decision rendered by the COMMISSION 
is supported by the record presented. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 
(1953). 
The picture painted by appellants of a timid and cowed 
COMMISSION, bullied by public opinion, is a mirage which disappears 
upon inspection. If anything, due process is promoted by publicly-
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witnessed deliberations so that a reviewing court can more easily 
determine if a decision has been reached on the basis of the recorc 
made. 
3. Appellants' Reliance Upon Foreign Case Authority is 
Misplaced. Utah clearly has adopted the view that open rate makinc 
deliberations are not a denial of due process. Appellants have 
represented, however, that several foreign jurisdictions have held 
that open deliberations are unconstitutional. However, of those 
decisions, only one high court, the Florida Supreme Court in ~ 
v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, supra. at p. 25 
has directly confronted and decided this issue. Their determinati: 
which remains the law of Florida, falls squarely against appellant 
As disclosed by t:'"Je examination which follows, those "authorities" 
relied upon bJ t~e ·~OMMISSION and MOUNTAIN FUEL reveal only that 
other jurisdictions, with dissimilar "sunshine" laws, interpret 
their controlling statutes differently. Not one of the cases cit~ 
by appellants rests it conclusion upon a finding that due process 
is offended by public deliberation. 
Decisions. 
A. The Pollution Control and Occidental Chemical 
Each appellant vociferously urges this Court to disrega. 
the majority holding of Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of 
Alachua County, supra., as either not representing the weight of 
authority or as being factually inapplicable to this proceeding. 
(St. Br. at 15-23; MFS Br. at 41-42). Indeed, appellant MOUNTAIN 
FUEL even suggests that subsequent Florida decisions discredit a~c 
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shed doubt upon the validity of Canney's holding. These argu-
ments are without merit. 
Canney represents the first and, to date, only pronounce-
ment by a state supreme court on the issue of whether or not the 
open deliberations of a non-judicial body inherently offend con-
stitutional guarantees of due process. To suggest that the "weight 
of authority" is against the Canney holding is without foundation. 
(MFS Br. at 41). 
MOUNTAIN FUEL's urging that the subsequent decisions in 
Occidental Chemical Co. v. Mayo, 351 So.2d 336 (Fla. 1977), and 
State Department of Pollution Control v. State Career Service Comm., 
320 So.2d 846 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1975), "significantly erode" the 
Canney holding can only be perceived as a calculated effort to mis-
lead. (MFS Br. at 42). In State Department of Pollution Control, 
supra., a Florida district court of appeal, not the Supreme Court, 
held as a matter of statutory construction that the quasi-judicial 
deliberations of the Career Service Commission need not be conducted 
openly. Superficially, this lower court's decision might be viewed 
as a rejection of the Canney holding. However, the decision was not 
based upon any constitutional due process consideration. In fact, 
the express holding of this lower court was repudiated in 1977 by 
the Florida Supreme Court in Occidental Chemical Co. v. Mayo, supra. 
In Occidental Chemical, the Florida Supreme Court was asked 
to decide whether the record disclosed facts to support appellant's 
claim that the commissioners of a public body had deliberated behind 
closed doors. On the basis of the record, the court concluded that 
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no such deliberations had occurred. As a matter of statutory con-
struction the court correctly held that the deliberations of the 
commission's staff were not subject to the Florida Sunshine Law 
because staff was not included within the act's coverage---
not, as suggested by MOUNTAIN FUEL, "even though the language of 
the Sunshine Act was clearly broad enough to have included such 
meetings." (MFS Br. at 43). Significantly, the court reaffirmed 
the Canney majority while repudiating State Department of Pollutic 
Control: 
The fact that the commission's decision 
making process has been characterized as 
quasi-judicial does not exempt it from 
the statute. 351 So. 2d at 341, fn. 7. 
(emphasis added) . 
Despite appel~ants' wishes to the contrary, the Canney rationale 
remains Vla~le ln Florida and is directly applicable to and per-
suasive Wlth respect to the present action. 
B. The Arizona Press Club Decision. As it did in the 
trial court, MOUNTAIN FUEL appears to rest its case upon Arizona 
Press Club v. Arizona Board of Tax Appeals, 558 P.2d 697 (Ariz. 
1976). This is curious since the Arizona Press Club decision was 
not based upon any constitutional consideration and arose from 
facts not remotely analagous to the present case. 
In Arizona Press Club, a taxpayer was dissatisfied with e 
tax valuation assessed against his property by a county assessor. 
Under Arizona law, the taxpayer had the option of either challen-
ging the assessment in Superior Court or petitioning the State 
Board of Tax Appeals. The Arizona Open Meeting law provided 
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generally that: 
All official meetings at which any legal 
action is taken by governing bodies shall 
be public meetings and all persons so 
desiring shall be permitted to attend and 
listen to the deliberations and proceed-
ings. A.R.S. § 38-431.01. 
This broad openness requirement was tempered by numerous except-
ions, including one which provided that: 
The provisions of this article shall not 
apply to any judicial proceedinl or any 
political caucas. A.R.S. § 38- 31.08 
(emphasis added) . 
The taxpayer was afforded a full and open hearing. At the 
close of the evidence the board opined that its "deliberation and 
decision is a judicial proceeding and, therefore, specifically ex-
empt from the open meeting law." 558 P.2d at 698. The board pro-
ceeded to deliberate in private and, on that ground, the taxpayer 
appealed to the State Supreme Court, arguing that the "judicial 
proceeding" exception to the act applied only to judicial hearings 
of courts and not to quasi-judicial hearings of administrative 
bodies. 
The question before the State Supreme Court was whether the 
tax board, when exercising its quasi-judicial power to resolve dis-
putes between a taxpayer and a county assessor, engaged in a 
"judicial proceeding." The court expressly held that the board 
acted "judicially" when hearing taxpayer appeals and concluded that 
the legislature intended to exempt all judicial proceedings, whether 
held by a court or an agency: 
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We do not believe that the legislature 
intended to exempt only court judicial 
proceedings and not administrative 
agency judicial proceedings. 558 P.2d 
at 699. 
The Arizona Press Club decision is not dispositive of the 
issues presented in this appeal for five separate reasons. 
First, the Arizona decision resulted solely from the 
court's interpretation of a statute, not from a holding that a 
contrary result would violate due process guarantees. 
Second, the act considered by the court is uncomparable 
to the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act. The Arizona act broadly 
declared that all meetings of every governing body be open and 
then qualified this broad directive with a statutory exception 
for "judicial proceedings." The Utah act is structured entirely 
differently. The Utah act takes great pains to specify those 
bodies to whlch t~e act requirements are applicable and is not 
subject to circumvention depending upon the type of proceeding in 
which the body is engaged. 
Third, under the standard use by the Arizona court to de-
termine whether an agency acts "judicially", it is clear that the 
deliberations of the COMMISSION would be found to be nonjudicial. 
In Arizona Press Club, the taxpayer had the option of presenting 
his grievance either to a court or to an administrative board. 
Here, rate making matters may go only to the COMMISSION because 
only the COMMISSION can exercise the legislative prerogative of 
setting rates. There is not present in this case the duality of 
function argument so important to the Arizona decision. 
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A related distinction between these two cases is evident 
from the express purposes of the two bodies. The Arizona Tax 
Board was charged with resolving a dispute between a county 
assessor, on the one hand, and a private citizen on the other, 
much like a court is requested to do. The COMMISSION, in the 
course of determining rates, is not presented with such a con-
troversy, nor is it asked to resolve any question which affects 
only two singular interests. 
Finally, in finding that the legislature intended to ex-
empt the tax board from the requirements of the act, the Arizona 
court reasoned that such private disputes were "not the area in 
which one need fear the alleged 'private deals' and extraneous 
considerations to the matter at hand. 558 P.2d at 699. With 
all due respect to our COMMISSIONERS, rate deliberations by politi-
cal appointees which affect the entire public and involve millions 
of consumer dollars are historically the type of activity where 
the fear of private deals, payoffs and influenced decision making 
is rampant. 
c. The Jordon Decision, Each appellant argues that 
Jordon v. District of Columbia, 362 A.2d 114 (D.C. 1976) stands 
for the proposition that due process mandates private delibera-
tions. An examination of the facts warrants a contrary conclusion. 
In Jordon, a police department's closed deliberation of a gun 
licensing application was challenged under a "sunshine" law which 
provided in total that: 
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All meetings, including hearings, of any 
department, agency, board or commission of 
the district government, including meet-
ings of the district council, at which 
official action of any kind is taken, 
shall be open to the public. No resolu-
tion, rule, act, regulation or other 
official action shall be effective unless 
taken, made or enacted at such meeting. 
D.C. Code§ l-1503a (1977 Supp.) 
The appellate court found that the proceeding in question was ad-
judicatory in nature - - a "contested" case - - and hence covered 
by the more directly applicable provisions of the District of 
Columbia Administrative Procedure Act which did not require open 
deliberations. 362 A.2d at 118. 
COMMON CAUSE seriously questions how this case, and its 
cited successors and progeny, are relevant or helpful to a reso-
lution of this matter. The Jordon decision rested upon the in-
terrelationship ~f twc statutes, not upon constitutional analysis. 
The terse statute ln question in Jordon is wholly incomparable 
to the specific design and definition of the Utah Act and invited 
an inquiry into legislative intent which is unnecessary in this 
action. While COMMON CAUSE disagrees with the Jordon dicta, its 
applicability to the facts of this case remains a mystery. 
D. The Stillwater Savings & Loan Decision. In Stillwater 
Savings and Loan Assn. v. Oklahoma Savings & Loan Board, 534 P.2d 
9 (Okla. 1975), a protestant appealed the board's grant of a cer-
tificate of authority on the grounds, inter alia, that the board'; 
failure to openly deliberate the issues violated the 1959 Oklaho~ 
Open Meetings Law. 25 O.S. 1971, § 201 et seq. In its one sen-
tence dismissal of this claim, the court said: 
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The "open meeting law" which was enacted 
in 1959, does not include hearings before 
the Oklahoma Savings and Loan Board when 
it acts in a quasi-judicial manner in in-
dividual proceedings such as the present 
case. 534 P.2d at ll. 
Obviously, no constitutional issue was discussed. Moreover, the 
holding that quasi-judicial actions in individual proceedings were 
exempted from the act does not favor appellants herein since 
neither of those two announced prerequisites are present in this 
action. Finally, the specific provisions of the Oklahoma act upon 
which this decision is based are not even presented by appellants 
as remotely comparable to the Utah Act. Indeed, if the 1959 
Oklahoma statute were comparable to the Arizona act considered in 
Arizona Press Club, supra., COMMON CAUSE would readily agree with 
the court's holding but would still question its relevance. In 
any event, this decision undoubtedly will not be followed by the 
State of Oklahoma since, in 1977, the statute was repealed when 
Oklahoma enacted a legitimate "sunshine" law. 25 O.S. § 201, et 
seq. (1977 Supp). 
E. The School District No. 9 Decision. The Wyoming 
Supreme Court's decision in School District No. 9 v. District 
Boundary Board, 351 P.2d 106 (Wyo. 1960), is likewise not control-
ling in the instant case as urged by the COMMISSION (Br. at 13). 
In the Wyoming case, appellants, without the benefit of any open 
meeting statute or rule of procedure, asserted that the private 
deliberations of a district boundary board demonstrated a "fraudu-
lent, willful, wanton and despotic attitude" of board members 
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sufficient alone to set aside a ruling within the board's juris-
diction. 351 P.2d at 110. The Wyoming court obviously ruled that 
since there was no statute, charter or zoning regulation which re-
quired the board to deliberate in public, the argument advanced 
by appellant was clearly without merit. 
COMMON CAUSE agrees with the holding of the Wyoming court 
but is at a loss to see how that decision has any relevance to 
this matter. The =ommon law may not require the COMMISSION to de-
liberate openly, which is exactly the reason the Open and Public 
Meetings Act was passed. The Wyoming court did not even suggest 
that the legislature constitutionally could not require such de-
liberations to be conducted in public. 
The distinctions that can be made between the authority 
cited by appellants and ~he facts of this case are numerous and 
material. No case urged by the COMMISSION or MOUNTAIN FUEL sup-
ports the allegation that rate making deliberations of the 
COMMISSION are acts which must constitutionally be performed in 
secret. Appellants have offered no authority or reasoning which 
threatens the heavy presumption of constitutionality attached to 
this legislation. Buhler v. Stone, 533 P.2d 292 (Utah 1975). 
VI 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-3-21 (4) (1953) 
DOES NOT MANDATE CLOSED DELI"BERA-
TIVE SESSIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-21 (4) (Repl. Vol. 6A, 1974), pro-
vides as follows: 
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Hearings or proceedings of the commission 
or of any commissioner shall be open to the 
public, and all records of all hearings or 
proceedings or orders, rules or investiga-
tions by the commission or any commissioner 
shall be at all times open to the public; 
provided, that any information furnished the 
commission by a public utility or by any 
officers, agent, employee of any public 
utility may be withheld from the public when-
ever and during such time as the commission 
may determine that it is for the best in-
terest of the public to withhold such in-
format~on. Any officer or employee of the 
commission who in violation of the provisions 
of this subsection divulges any such inform-
ation is guilty of a misdemeanor. (emphasis 
added) . 
COMMON CAUSE makes no contention, as suggested by the COMMISSION, 
that the above-quoted provision was impliedly repealed nor is it 
necessary to respondents' case to do so. A careful reading of the 
section reveals that the COMMISSION cannot, as the State contends, 
"invoke the statute whenever it pleases in order to close any of 
its deliberations." (St. Br. p. 10). First, the section does not 
authorize closure of meetings, but only the withholding of" .. 
information furnished the COMMISSION by a public utility. 
Thus, the statute offers no support to the COMMISSION for closure 
of its deliberative sessions nor can it support secret voting and 
a refusal to review how each Commissioner votes. In fact, the 
express statutory language compels the opposite conclusion: 
Hearings or proceedings of the commission 
or of any commissioner shall be open to 
the public, and all records of all hearings 
or proceedings or orders, rules or investi-
gations by the commission or any commissioner 
shall be at all times open to the public. 
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Second, the section does not grant carte blanche discretion to 
the COMMISSION to withhold information at any time. A finding by 
the COMMISSION must be made that "it is for the best interest of 
the public to withhold such information." Of course, such a find-
ing must be based upon the record or reasonable belief, cannot be 
arbitrarily made, and would be subject to Court review. 
CONCLUSION 
Attempts to circumvent the plain meaning of open and pub-
lie meeting laws are commonplace and have been met with judicial 
disfavor. As recognized by the Florida Supreme Court in Canney 
v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, supra., dis-
satisfied parties, such as defendants herein, should commit their 
resources and time toward lobbying the legislature for changes in 
such laws instead c:;':_ lobbying the judiciary: 
Various boards and agencies have obviously 
attempted to read exceptions into the 
Government in the Sunshine Law which do 
not exist. Even though their intentions 
may be sincere, such boards and agencies 
should not be allowed to circumvent the 
plain provisions of the statute. The 
benefit to the public far outweighs the 
inconvenience of the board or agency. If 
the board or agency feels aggrieved, then 
the remedy lies in the halls of the 
Legislature and not in efforts to circum-
vent the plain provisions of the statute 
by devious ways in the hope that the 
judiciary will read some exception into 
the law. 278 So.2d at 264. 
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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALAN E. WALCHER 
Suite 318, Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Respondents COMMON 
CAUSE and MARJORIE J. THOMAS 
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